Dramatic changes in ethnic proportions in Latvia and Estonia in combination with general social and economical contradictions of the “real socialism” made basis for fundamental political, economical and social changes, where ethnic problems played exeptionally important role. Therefore the tendency is present to understand situation in Latvia in the nineties in terms of ethnic conflict that reached crisis point in 1993 – 1994 were followed in 1994 – 1999 by transition to de-escalation, a ‘wait-and-see’ period, exploration of alternative strategies of conflict management through political and societal integration. The period from the late 1999 onwards is characterized as initial attenuation of ethnic tensions and start of conflict transformation in conjunction with implementation of integrationist strategies of ethnic peace-building [1].
There are no doubts about intense political, social and economic tensions in Latvia in the end of eighties - beginning of nineties. Nevertheless the question may be asked: to what extent this tensions may be undersood in the terms of ethnic conflict ? If yes, how to explain that despite almost fifty - fifty proportions of main linguistic groups in Latvia the peaceful path of sociopolitical transformations was possible and the “balcanisation” of the situation was avoided?
Questions concerning language, development of ethnic culture and decrease of specific weight of Latvians within population of Latvia played extraordinary important role in political mobilisation of Latvians who, in their turn played a leading role in political transformations in Latvia in eighties and nineties. In the same time, “social conflicts are about incompatible goals”[2], therefore the question may be asked, to what extent ethnic aspirations of Latvians in the end of eighties – beginning of nineties were confronted with contradicting or incompatible ambitions of other ethnic groups in Latvia, especially that of Russians ? And at last, but not least - what are the perspectives for development of the relations between main ethnic groups nowadays?
It seems to ne that in this connection the look on the transformation and interaction of identities of main etnic groups of society is of a great importance and for the concepts of “normality” and “normalisation” may be useful.
The usual connotations of the word “normal” is “conforming to the standard or the common type”.[3] “Normal” person is like everyone else, behaves as most people behave, and stays within current conventions. The notion of “normality as used in social sciences is connected with multiplicity of understandings. On the other hand, the advantage of the notion of “normality” is connected with possibility to bind together objective descriptions of social structures and processes with changes of identities of main actors of social life, and discourses where understanding of “normality” is constructed.
Three possible approaches to understand “normality” may be distinguished. - The first possibility presupposes that something may be described as “normal” on basis of its conformity to more or less universal criteria, like “human nature”, “legal norms”, “rules of economy” etc.
- The second way of understanding “normality” is to define it on the basis of belonging to the dominant culture.
- And at lest but not least the third possiility of understanding normality is connected with emphasis on question whether in society the set of basic conventions as a basis for stability of society and its sustainable development is present
The first possibility of understanding “normality” in connection with post-Communist Latvia is developed by Daina Stukuls Eglitis[4]. She understands concept of “normality” as supplement for the explanatory concept of nationalism, and links concept of “normality” to questions of elevation and salvation of nation on the basis of “normal” political, legal and economical conditions. The second way of approaching “normality” is, as it was mentioned above, its understanding as belonging to the dominant culture which refers to that of the people who are either the greatest in number or who have the most political,economic and symbolic power. The group which identifies itself with the dominant culture especially with the language dominant in political, social, cultural and economical life usually understands this situation as “normal” and differ itself from “minorities” (or “abnormalities”) - other ethnic and cultural groups claiming for their language, cultural, sometimes also – political and economical rights and recognition. The “normality – minority” distinction is closely connected with structure of identity. Within “normal” identity the role of ethnic questions such as survival of language, education in native language etc. usually play less important role compared to social, economical questions, identification with the state, community, region or religion. Situation of “normality” doesn’t presuppose that carrier of “normality” constitutes a majority of population. As example, situation of Swedes in Finland in the first part of 19th century may be mentioned, where Swedish language was language of administration and cultural life, therefore it was just “normal” language, and Swedes were, how to say, carriers of “normality” . In the same time Finns as majority of population represented “minority” or “anomality” in this context. This situation fundamentally changed in the second part of the 19th century and beginning of 20th century The question may be stated, to what extent “normality - minority” distinction may be applied for understanding of relations between Latvians and Russians in Latvia? Historical experience of Latvians is that of centuries long minority experience under German, Swedish, Polish and Russian domination, which was interrupted by twenty years of independent statehood between First and Second World Wars, followed by tragic events of Soviet occupation in June, 1940, and later repressions and russification. These feelings were supported by dramatic changes in ethnic composition of Latvia during the postwar decades. This experience was the real basis for extremely high level of the mass participation during the years of “singing revolution”, and, in the same time, it produced various illusions and prejudices in mass consciousness, which strongly influenced political culture of society and until now determine behaviour of the main political forces[5]. Now it seems necessary to turn shortly to the specifical features of Russian identity in general and those in Latvia, especially in the end of eighties – beginning of nineties. The historical memory of Russians in the former Soviet Union was based on experience of a big nation which felt itself associated with the Russia and later Soviet Union as the whole, what, in its turn, as British historian Geoffrey Hosking states, presupposed underdevelopment of Russian nationhood in both aspects of nationhood – civic and ethnic ones.[6] Fulfillment of the essential state functions of the Russian Empire and later - Soviet Union (army, the administrative and industrial structure of national scale), was based on Russian language, which in this connection was the “normal” basis for communication and fulfillment of the state-level administrative functions Therefore the Russian-speakers objectively got essential preferences – social, as well as linguistic. Almost in every corner of the former Soviet Union Russians – beyond their specific weight in population - had possibility to fulfill their essential needs - to speak to government officials, physicians and usually to people on the streets - in their native language. As David D. Laitin correctly states, “Russians outside of the RSFSR were protected from coming to terms with their “minority” status”[7] In this connection it is important to point out that great majority of post-war Russian-speaking migrants to non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union didn’t think of themselves as “immigrants” to another country or “minority”. Instead they saw themselves as moving around within a single country – a country in which Russians formed a majority throughout the country as a whole[8]
In this connection it has to be mentioned, that during the “singing revolution” (1988 – 1991) the Popular Front of Latvia made special efforts in order to make its ideas understandable for Russian-speaking part of population of Latvia. In the beginning lectors of the Popular Front tried to speak with Russians in the same “language” as with Latvians, making accents on cultural values and language, and had to recognize that this approach was only partly fruitful. The questions which were important for Russian-speakers were not ethnic, but social and economic ones. Unfortunately there are no sociological data concerning ethnic consciousness of inhabitants of Latvia in the last years of Soviet power and during “singing revolution”. In accordance with sociological surveys made in 1993, there were important differences in perception of the other ethnic groups between Latvians and Russians in Latvia which shows that ethnocultural differences also two years after renewal of independence – what many authors consider as the peak of ethnic conflict in Latvia - played less important role in self-understanding of Russians as social and economical similarities with Latvians[9]. On the basis of arguments mentioned above the conclusion may be made that attitudes of the majority of Russian – speaking population were on the different “level” in comparison with the demands of Latvians for preservation of Latvian language and culture, and independence as fundamental mean of achieving this goals, or, at least, were not in direct contradiction with them. This produced, how to say, ‘momentum of normality”, namely the orientation of Russian – speaking population mainly on social and economical issues, which played extraordinary important role in ensuring peaceful character of the renewal of independence of Latvia. In this connection comparison between Latvia on the one hand, and former Yugoslavia, on the other, seems to be useful in order to explain rather different path of development in two countries despite quite similar starting positions with respect to proportions between main ethnic groups. It seems to me that one of the most important cultural presuppositions of tragic ethnic conflicts in Balkans was the obstacle not present in Baltics, namely that all main ethnic groups of former Yugoslavia in the same time perceived themselves as endangered, although sometimes on clear mythological and irrational basis. In case of Latvia one of important presuppositions of peaceful character of political transformations was more or less neutral position occupied by great majority of Russian speaking population as regards to demands of pro-independence forces. During the years of “singing revolution” majority of Russian-speaking population was interested rather in possible social and economical benefits of dismantling of “real socialism” political and economical system than in prospects of their language, culture and education as result of these changes. Changes of identities of the Latvia’s main ethnic groups during the years of renewed independence of Latvia may be described as the mixture of two processes. On the one hand, there are changes of Latvian identity from “minority” to “normality”, recognition in mass cosciousness of new prospects for Latvian nation due to renewal of independence and return to the “normal” path of development of Latvia interrupted by Soviet occupation in June, 1940. These changes are slowed down by various subjective and objective factors, such as “momentum of minority” and employment of popular fears and prejudices for political purposes by various political forces, still unfavourable for Latvians ethnic composition of society, especially in big cities, the fact that Latvians are still minority in the biggest cities of Latvia, and at last but not least - lack of clear understanding (mainly due to shortage of information) of prospects for distinctive Latvian culture within the European Union. On the other hand, one may speak about transformation of Russian identity from “normality” to “minority”, sometimes rather painful process of recognition of a new nonpriviliged social situation, what, in its turn, strengthens the ethnic identity of Russians. This process, which takes place not only in Latvia but also in other former Soviet republics, in Latvia was accelerated among other factors by adoption of the Education Law of 1998, which prescribes that since 2004 the instruction language in state financed secondary educational institutions will be Latvian. The processes mentioned above may be schematic displayed as follows: 
The conclusion may be made that stability of society of Latvia may be challenged by uneven “velocity” of these two processes. Russian-speakers move from “normality” to “minority” faster than Latvians are able to overcome their fears and prejudices based on previous historical experience. Therefore the possibility of the collision of minority feelings exists and conclusion may be made, that at present Latvia stands on the break point of the relations between main ethnic and linguistic groups. Two options of futher development still exist: the consolidation of previous achievements and deepenig of the integration processes, on the one hand, and evolution towards escalation of ethnic discontent, on the other. Here the third approach of “normality” comes to forefront, namely, normality as stability and sustainability, especially within relations between main ethnic and cultural groups of society. As Will Kymlicka correctly points, the main question here is to ensure ethnocultural justice instead of unachievable equality of ethnic groups in their relations to the state, where the concrete expressions of justice and forms of minority rights may vary substantially from country to country[10]. One is clear – the just solution has to be acieved by democratic means, what, in its turn, states a question: which one of the various contemporary models of democracy may provide appropriate setup for societies divided by ethnic lines. In this connection “agonistic” model of democracy elaborated by Chantal Mouffe’s seems to me the most plausible for conceptualization of tendencies in relations between main ethnic groups of Latvia. For Mouffe, “the main question of democratic politics is not how to eliminate power but how to constitute forms of power more compatible with democratic values”.[11] The aim of politics is “the creation of unity in context of conflict and diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an ‘us’ by the determination of a ‘them’”[12]. Instead of phantasmal attempts to overcome us/them opposition, crucial feature of democratic politics according to Mouffe is constructing of ‘them’ in the way that perceives carrier of different values, preferences, style of life, or, at last but not least, language and religion, as enemy to be destroyed, but as ‘adversary’, who is a legitimate opponent and object of toleration, which presupposes principal disagreement on the one hand, and conviction that “other” has inalienable right to express his/her otherness, on the other. Coming coser to Latvia, it has to be pointed out that one of the main challenges for Latvian political elite and substantial part of Latvian-speaking population is to accept that democratic development of Latvia to great extent depends on acknowledgement of Russian community as more than object of political decisions of Latvian-speaking political elite, but also as legitimate adversary whose proposals and preferences cannot be simply rejected, they have to become part of political discussions. In this connection one of the most important presuppositions of “normalisation” of ethnic relations in Latvia and, therefore, society in general is creation of “ethico-political consensus” as prerequisite for political decisions. The creation of such “ethico-political consensus” presupposes moral choice from both sides. For great part of Latvians it means recognition of rights of Russians to develop themselves in Latvia as Russians, in other words - transition from pseudotolerance imposed to great extent by external pressure to tolerance in its full liberal sense, namely recognition of other’s rights to self-expression as a matter of principle. For Russians, in their turn, moral choice seems to be connected with ability and willingness to recognize that upside-down situation inherited from the Soviet past has to be fundamentally changed and new, non-privileged position of Russians has to be acknowledged. It is hard to predict, which concrete political settings will take place in further development of ethnic relations in Latvia. Nevertheless it seems clear, that “normalization” of relations between main ethnic groups of Latvia as crucial aspect of general “normalization” of society cannot be based on pure pragmatic compromise. The moral prerequisites of political decisions seem to be of a great importance. _________________
[1] Airat Aklaev. From Confrontation to Integration. (RPIF-Report No. 59/2001). http://www.hsfk.de/deu/pub/prifrep5901.htm, p.1. [2] Louis Krisberg. Conflict, social. In: The Social Science Encyclopedia. Ed. by Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston and Henley, 1985, p. 147. [3] Webster Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language. Portland House, New York, 1989, p. 983. [4] Daina Stukuls Eglitis. Imagining the Nation. History, Modernity and Revolution in Latvia. The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002, 265 p. [5] See: Juris Rozenvalds. The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals in a Transitional Society. In: New Ethics – New Society. Acta Philosophica Fennica. Vol. 65, 2000. Ed. by Timo Airaksinen and Olli Loukola. Helsinki, 2000, p. 225 – 226. [6] Geoffrey Hosking. Russia. People and Empire.Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1997, p. XX. [7] David. D. Laitin. Identity in Formation. The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Cornell University Press, Itaca and London, 1998, p. 69. [8] Will Kymlicka. Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations. In: Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Ed. by Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski. Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 76. [9] B.Zepa. Valsts statusa maiņa un pilsoniskā apziņa. In: Sabiedrības pārmaiņas Latvijā. Rīga: Jumava, 1998, p. 11- 112. [10] Will Kymlicka. Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations. In: Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Ed. by Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski. Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 21-22. [11] Ibidem, p. 100. [12] Ibidem, p. 101. |
